April 2025

1. I would be interested in interview opportunities with Farm Journal to discuss highlights from the Monthly Monitor survey:

2. Consider the current state of the U.S. agricultural economy. Please indicate how it compares to one month ago. Select one.



3. Consider the current state of the U.S. agricultural economy. Please indicate how it compares to one year ago. Select one.



4. Consider your expected state of the U.S. agricultural economy in 12 months. Please indicate how it compares to today. Select one.



Q58 - What are the two most important factors driving agriculture's economic health today as well as in 12 months?

What are the two most important factors driving agriculture's economic health today as well as in 12 months?

Weather will always be one of the primary factors, but we can add President Trump's efforts to restructure global trade to that list this year. We're in worse shape if he fails and better shape if he succeeds. Big stakes!
The path that the tariff war takes. The crop weather in 2025 in the US, Russia, and South America.
A) the ability of farmers to manage market volatility from uncertainty around trade policy into their marketing plan, B) balancing input costs and marketing to ensure breakeven.
upside potential for prices, and reduced uncertainty around trade and related policies
What happens with trade/tariffs is likely the biggest factor now and over the next 12 months across all of agriculture – will there be more tariffs on inputs, more retaliatory tariffs on ag products, more trade agreements with purchase of ag products? In the short term, actual U.S. planted acres and the start to the growing season will be factors for the crop sector.
political uncertainty negative tariff impacts
Uncertainty with respect to trade and farm policy. Slumping market prices for grains.
the imposition of tariffs, and resultant retaliatory tariffs, is very adverse to US agriculture. Things improve if the President capitulates on tariff policy.
Today: 1) Slowing export sales for grain and meat, 2) Threat of retaliatory tariffs from trading partners. Future: 1) Escalating trade tensions and loss of export sales, 2) increasing interest rates.
Consumer demand Interest rates
Direct and indirect effects of tariff policies and the state of the general economy.
Trade war and... trade war?
Tariffs Interest Rates
Uncertainty around tariff policy and related efforts (ad hoc payments, for example). We are in peak uncertainty at the moment.

Uncertainty makes it quite difficult to plan ahead, exposing agriculture to some really nasty bullwhip effects due to conflicting information in both inputs and outputs.

Today: planting conditions and mentality
12 months: markets

Status of trade issues and the supply-side (crop size) of the balance sheets.

Crop prices are relatively low. Actual planted acres will change the relative profitability between corn, soybeans, and wheat.

Tariffs are threatening export sales, particularly those for soybeans and wheat.

US trade policy, and continuing squeeze on farm margins

6. Is the crops sector of agriculture currently in a recession?



6a. Why?

Why?

Compressed margins

Depending how farmers measure fixed/ownership costs, many may be facing negative returns over total costs for both old crop and new crop sales.

decline in value of output relative to a year earlier. Tighter margins also probably reduce secondary activity out of the crops sector.

Negative returns for at least the 3rd consecutive year across nearly all row crops.

There is significant concern over profitability and as I understand, more operating debt was carried over from last year that will be hard for producers to catch up on this year. This is carrying over to declines in equipment purchases too.

Corn/SB/Wheat prices have declined while the cost of production has not

Prices for most crops have declined more since 2022 than production expenses. Supplemental payments provided this year moderate the situation, but they provide what may prove to be only temporary relief.

Prices at current levels are unlikely to cover inputs.

The notion of a recession is very precise in the macroeconomy. As a rule of thumb, it is typically defined as two consecutive quarters of negative economic GDP growth. I would say one could argue that we've already experienced two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth in row crops.

Without government supports that have already been delivered, Congress would be moving quickly to provide that support. The $10 billion in financial aid softened the negative impact of current conditions.

Margins in 2024 were below average. Projected margins do not look any better.

Commodity and input prices and uncertainty due to trade war

6b. Why not?

Why not?

Given the volatility in the crop session, a recession requires at least two bad return years, where returns include both private market and government payments. We do not know about 2025 yet, nor do we know the extent of government payments for 2024 crops yet and thus what will be the total return for 2024.

Economic performance and growth of U.S. ag. is slowing and/or stable, but not declining. It is too early for the impacts of tariffs to change business decision making in ag. production.

Profit opportunities are there but slim

We are in a period of lower crop prices and declining margins, but calling it a recession is a misnomer. First, low crop prices and tight margins is the normal condition for ag. Farm incomes remain robust, crop prices have hung in remarkably well given the policy choices made by this administration re trade and biofuels.

There is both the camp that we are in the midst of a long term recession and those that feel that land prices are holding because the built up equity in farm operations is allowing for it. Both can be true.

Q401 - What defines a recession in agriculture?

What defines a recession in agriculture?

When margins are compressed enough to cause farmers to cut back on new investments, slowing purchases of equipment and other capital assets.

At least two consecutive years of returns, including government payments, that cover 95% or less of economic cost as defined by USDA, ERS.

The inability on average for agricultural revenue to cover total costs. Under this definition the crops sectors (principal crops) are facing a recession.

I take a similar view a macro recession in a decline in overall value (similar to GDP) as well as known or very likely reduction in secondary activity.

I'm not aware of an official definition of recession for the agriculture sector, but I look at metrics like farm income, profitability margins, and farm financial ratios. Prolonged declines across these metrics would be signals of sectoral recession in agriculture.

I see recession as continued years of average production costs exceeding market prices.

Negative production margins for 6-12 month

The simple definition is a system wide reduction in economic performance. This would/should include production agriculture, as well as marketing/processing of food, fiber and bioenergy. My preferred measure is an estimate of net income across the ag. sector, but this is admittedly very difficult to quantify. A general 'agricultural economic sentiment' may be more accurate. This sentiment factor would need to be downward trending for at least two quarters.

I hesitate to use the term when speaking of a particular sector of the economy but presume a key feature would be a sharp decline in net profitability. Some other indicators might include lower asset values and increases in signs of financial distress, such as higher rates of loan delinquency.

I don't know. Recession is really a term applied to the entire economy, not very specific subsectors like crop production.

A sustained decline in farm sector profitability.

There isn't a definition of agricultural recessions, so the question is confusing (if not misleading).

Furthermore, there is even confusion about the definition of a recession in the U.S. economy. Textbooks have a rule of thumb, but U.S. recessions are determined by an independent board that defines the start and end of economic cycles in the U.S. economy.

Maybe the latter approach—measuring agricultural expansions and contractions—is a way for FJ to create value in this space.

Negative economic growth for a sustained period of time.

Noone knows- see my previous response. There is a broad definition for a recession but one for agriculture is not well defined.

The need for federal economic assistance. Year-to-year downtrends in net farm income (sans government supports).

Relatively low margins or net farm income for a particular sector (e.g., crop sector). In general, the livestock sector is definitely not in a recession.

Successive quarters of declining farm incomes

8. Does the current environment of low commodity prices and high input costs accelerate consolidation in the row crop operations and allied industries?

9. Why?

Why?
Tough times always tend to eliminate the lowest efficiency operations of those still remaining.
If the less efficient full-time farmer cannot cover total costs, even if cash costs are covered, this means once cash assets and liquid assets such as grains, breeding herd, etc. are liquidated then the farmer will not financially be able to continue, and farm land sales will increase. These will likely be purchased by the larger, higher productive farm operations that can withstand a down cycle.
there are likely to be buying opportunities for the more efficient producers, who likely also have either cash on hand or better access to credit (more credit worthy), to buy out the less efficient producers who may be forced to exit. This applies to both farm and allied industries.
A sustained period of high costs and low prices will likely result in some farmers going out of business sooner than expected, which may be due to early retirement, point of financial need, or stopping by choice ahead of that. When farm consolidation is accelerated, there are fewer farmers buying inputs. Even though total acres stay about the same, fewer input retailers are needed to serve the customer base.
I see it as larger operators just having economies of scale and larger business enterprises against which to allocate costs.
While consolidation is a long-term trend driven by technology and a wide range of factors, low incomes result in more involuntary departures--more people are leaving the sector because they have to, not because they want to.
Farming produces small margins and larger acreage is needed to sustain the business; however, current cash flow situations do not make land acquisition obtainable for smaller operations.
Large firms have a longer runway.

Those with a good asset base will continue to expand. The U.S. has added a lot of equity to farm balance sheets and we continue to want to add more with beginning farmer and rancher programs that just continue to build wealth for established families.

Less profit to go around means the economy of these segments can't support as many participants.

When margins are tight, financial stress, particularly for medium sized operations, increases. Low margins also entice semi-retired farmers to hand up their cleats.

Farm bankruptcies, knock-on effects to input suppliers, and land prices remaining high

9. Why not?

Why not?

Consolidation depends on which farms survive. It is possible the survivors will be the smaller farms with substantial non-farm income.

It is still too early in a potential contraction cycle. There is still too much wealth and potential borrowing capacity. Historically, consolidation is forced by lack of ability to reinvest in infrastructure (i.e. can't live on depreciation any longer).

10. Do you think the U.S. general economy will see a recession in 2025?



11. Which best describes the current condition of the U.S. economy? - Selected Choice



11a. Other (please explain) - Text

Other (please explain) - Text
The key will be how long the current tariff policy remains in place. A renegotiation of trade policies would provide more stability and likely redirect investment.
Pointed to a recession (overall) with some sectors struggling greatly

12. Do you think President Trump’s strategy of using tariffs as a negotiating tool will benefit U.S. agriculture in the long-run?

12a. Why?

Why?
It's a high-risk, high stakes approach to try to reopen trading opportunities with countries that had been restricting U.S. products from entering their borders. We should see increased trade if he's successful, but we'll speed up the loss of markets if he is not.

In my opinion, if the objective of the trade conflict is to drive trade deals, then I believe the administration will be increasingly willing to negotiate if the economy eventually slows and political sentiment moves against hardline tariffs.

I think it will force our export destination list to diversity as well as incentivize expansion of domestic use (even if via policy).

I remain hopeful President Trump can use the leverage of tariffs to bring discussion of the many technical barriers to trade and the sanitary and phytosanitary issues that constrain exports to the table.

12b. Why Not?

Why Not?

loss of confidence in U.S. as a trading partner
Global markets will continue to adjust without the U.S.

Ultimately the US will be viewed as a less reliable supplier

Agriculture is not the focal point for the current tariff policies and potential renegotiation of trade agreements. The structural changes to trade will take many years to fully implement. The primary countries that buy our agricultural products are diversifying their supply chains to spread risk. The U.S. has been able to sustain and grow markets by being a reliable supplier with consistent quality, with competitive pricing (not necessarily the lowest prices). The U.S. is losing this competitive advantage.

There has already been significant damage to trade relationships, and investments and economic growth are likely to slow. There may be cases where new agreements provide tangible benefits to the farm sector, but it seems premature to bet on those potential benefits exceeding clear costs.

Trade generates wealth and a move towards a domestic-oriented economy (autarky) will destroy current gains from trade for both US producers and consumers.

Losses will be too large in the short run.

Retaliatory tariffs = lower demand

Think about how long it took for US agriculture to develop those international markets. Now think about how fragile that trust is. Hard to win that back.

It is likely the gains that will happen will be short lived (short defined as till the next presidential election). The trick will be to avoiding the confusion between benefits of things that make a substantial difference and those that are artificially inflated. One could argue that the Phase 1 Trade agreement had no long term legs under it.

The tariffs make the U.S. and unreliable supplier to the rest of the world. Importers will move to more-reliable suppliers.

We are going to lose export market share for some key products (e.g., soybeans and wheat). It is very difficult to get this market share back. We are likely to become a residual supplier.

Intensification of trade war with China speeds up loss of markets hare to Brazil, and risk of lost markets elsewhere, depending on tariff retaliation

13. How is the current trade war different than the last trade war (2018-2020)?

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This one is more comprehensive - far more countries involved. President Trump seems to understand that it's easy to go around trade policy by moving products through different countries, so that's why he's approaching it all at once.

The size and breadth of tariffs are much higher and broader in scope this time. Federal government revenue is a more prominent objective this time. This trade war involves more than tariffs.

1) for China, Brazil has become a larger share of soybean exports, making their dependency on US soybeans lower; 2) the proposed and now delayed widespread tariffs included many more countries; 3) the trade conflict (depending on delays) is potentially concurrent with Mexico, Canada, and China

Overall I think it is broader and more rapid series of events. The Trump administration learned a lot about 'how' to do these things during their prior time in power which enables things to move faster and more organized this time.

The previous trade war included other nations but overall seemed more focused on disparities with China. This trade war still has a heavy focus on China but also includes addressing disparities with many nations. This round seems more geared toward establishing binary deals and coalitions. There are still many unknowns in how this will compare/contrast with the previous trade war.

damage to U.S. reputation is much more severe.

The current trade war isn’t just China but is impacting literally all major trading partners of the U.S.

Tariffs on China (and retaliation) essentially makes it an embargo. The broad-based 10% tariffs were not in place in 2018. The theme of this tariff action might be called MBGA - make Brazil great again

It is much broader and impacts many more countries. The previous trade war was more focused on China. In addition, the previous tariffs were very targeted at parts and components, not all products. The 2018-2020 strategy created economic uncertainty in China but did not create significant inflationary pressure on U.S. consumers. The current broad tariffs will impact consumer prices.

It affects far more countries and the path to resolution seems even murkier.

It's way bigger and further reaching. The tariffs imposed last time look surgical in their precision compared to tariffs applied to every nation on earth.

China currently has a large amount of stocks and can make the trade war last longer.

Magnitude and scope. The current is much bigger. There also isn't a clear objective (increase revenue, better terms etc.)

There was a clear target in the last one.

it is much broader and deeper. The commodity markets seems to assume that this is already a joke and will see resolutions or retractions before new crop harvest.

The goals - I think - are different. China was a very specific target in 2018. Mexico and Canada were targets as well, but that started with the premise a positive conclusion would be reached. Now border issues, fentanyl, trade balances (not just tariffs) are all on the list of what needs to be "fixed."

This one is worse because it involves more countries.

US-China tariffs are now at prohibitive levels, and many more countries being drawn into facing tariffs on their exports, with much higher risk of across-the-board retaliation

14. Do you think USDA will compensate farmers for losses again (like the previous Trump administration did with MFP)?



14a. Why?

Why?

USDA Secretary Rollins has essentially stated that is what President Trump is prepared to do.

Farmers are an important political consistency for President Trump and the 2026 midterm elections are important if he is to achieve his policy goals.

I think that if the market justification exists similar to last time that the administration will find a way to included payments. At this time, given the timing of the marketing year, and current futures prices, if a trade deal is struck before U.S. harvest, I do not see the USDA justifying a payment. This largely depends on the dynamics of the next 6 months.

Simply put, it's about politics. They do not want to lose rural support. And, both Trump and Rollins have promised this will happen if needed. However, I think they will be slower to roll out aid to make sure it really is truly needed. They will let markets work first, before bringing out the checkbook.

This administration/USDA has declared intention to compensate farmers if there are measurable impacts.

The administration has been very vocal about doing so and Republicans would potentially face backlash at the ballot box if we've lost markets and the Trump team doesn't follow-up on its promises.

Because there are 2 Senators per state, and in the Midwest those Senators have an implied obligation to protect farmers

The Administration has provided strong indications of its intent to do so if economic harm is clear. However, the magnitude of any such payments may be limited by institutional constraints.

He has too, or he will lose his voter base, and the House and Senate will definitely flip in 2026.

The USDA has already signaled that it wants more money going to farmers.

They've said they would. It's political malpractice to say you'll create a welfare program and then not do it. No politician will do that because their reputation is at stake.

It's what Congress does. They will find a way to define the costs of the trade war by commodity and compensation will be made.

They have already signaled that this is a strong possibility.

14b. Why Not?

Why Not?

In the previous trade war it was very easy to argue that U.S. agriculture was more heavily impacted than other sectors of the U.S. economy. The current trade war will impact consumers and almost all of the industries in the U.S. economy. It will be much more difficult to justify direct support for agriculture without support for other industries. A multi-industry direct support package will be too expensive to pass in the U.S. congress.

Politically infeasible - if tariffs raise the US inflation rate, consumers who are also voters/taxpayers may be unwilling to support such policies, plus budget hawks in the House will push back on such transfers

15. Is it too soon for the White House and USDA to consider compensating farmers for financial fallout from a trade war?

15a. Why?

Why?
Other than China, we've seen no retaliatory tariffs yet to this point. And China quit buying U.S. corn, wheat, and grain sorghum some time ago. It is hurting beef and pork exports, but prices are still holding up. Cotton exports are being hurt as well, but prices there remain similar to where they were six months ago as well.
It is not clear that any damage has been done at present, at lest as measured by a lack of strong trends in market prices. Most inputs for 2025 production have already been purchased, at least for crop production. 2025 production is not known, which could substantially alter prices and revenues.
As mentioned in the previous answer, the timing of the marketing year, and current futures price levels do not seem to indicate economic harm. The development of the trade war or trade deals in the next 6 months will be key.
Markets need time to react and adjust first before they start rolling out money. Or they risk doing further damage to input costs and production costs more generally.
This administration/USDA has declared intention to compensate farmers if there are measurable impacts, but I think it’s early to be able to calculate impacts at this point.
My sense is we need to see where we are in 60-90 days with respect to negotiated agreements with the many countries that have come to the table. And I particularly feel we need to get a readout on what the future with China may be. While appropriate to indicate the Administration will be there to support agriculture, it’s just too early to know what the impact will be when producers begin to bring in this season’s crop.
There has not been enough 'financial pain' realized yet.
We still have little idea how things will play out, and early market responses have been muted.
The impacts of the trade war on farm prices and income are either negligible to this point or unknown. Any payment calculation would be a pure guess.

If farmers thing there will be long term gain then why don't we tell them to use that long term gain to cover their short term losses?

The total losses can't be defined at this point.

It takes time for export markets to adjust. In particular, there is a substantial amount of downside risk associated with soybean prices. Some of this has been factored into the market, but the worst-case scenario has not been factored in. In short, things could get worse than expected.

Too early to measure damage to export revenues and prices

15b. Why Not?

Why Not?

It is better to be pro-active than re-active.

The impacts are already being felt, but this is going to get worse and small farms are going to need a much larger runway to manage through it.

16. Could the talk of programs like MFP incentivize farmers to plant more acres in 2025?

16a. Why?

Why?

Expected payments become part of expected returns. In this case, increasing them and probably reducing risk. Both effects usually lead to more acres, or at least no cut in acres.

It could incentivize farmers to plant more acres, but only if they believe any round of MFP payments will be tied to 2025 planted acres similar to ECAP and 2024 planted acres. The challenge is if farmers believe the level of payments will more than cover any potential losses by planting on possibly less productive acres.

Yes. I marked yes, because it could incentive more acres given the numerous ad hoc programs in recent years have been linked to planted acres. But whether it could incentivize acres and does incentivize acres are two different things. Farmers are still in a high-cost environment with a lot of uncertainty and projections for negative margins.

Any time there is talk of a payment that could be tied to production, it probably causes at least a few marginal acres to be planted that might have otherwise been idled or put to other uses. However, in this case, the effects are likely to be very small given the level of uncertainty.

It was based on planted 2024 acres and people don't like to miss out on free money.

These payments change the net margins of planted crops. This is particularly true for soybeans. Potential payments drastically change the relative profitability between corn and soybeans.

Moral hazard

16b. Why Not?

Why Not?

Farmers don't farm for subsidies. Planting decisions are made by their assessment of export / price opportunities relative to costs.

It COULD, but the effect is likely very small. Given the uncertainty of whether the program will actually happen, no farmer would be wise to 'plant for the program'. However, I am sure a few would say they would, but I doubt that is really the case. It may help with their feeling of upside v. downside risk, which may shift acres to a small degree, but probably not incentivize more acres.

I believe producers will plant the crops that pencil out the best on the basis of known prices, input costs, etc. While something similar to MFP payments is being discussed, the amounts and timing are totally uncertain.

Too late

Total U.S. planted acres don't change much from year to year. There can be a shifting of acres between crops, but total planted acres change very little. A poorly designed MFP program could shift acres between crops.

Unless payments were tied to 2025 production, the acreage effects are likely small, especially given that planting is already underway.

Payments are unlikely to cover costs, and thus this could be a perilous gamble.

Farmers don't add or abandon acreage in the U.S. Payments might send market-distorting signals about which crop is more/less appealing, but it's hard to understand how providing clarity and certainty about 2025 growing season will spill into 2026.

Talk does not equate to policy. Uncertainty reigns supreme right now.

Those decisions have been made.

17. What is the most effective way for the ag economy to counter the long-term effects of tariffs? - Selected Choice



17a. Other (please explain) - Text

Other (please explain) - Text
I think build domestic demand for U.S. ag products is the answer for some commodities but doesn't work for all, outside of that I think negotiate tariff rates down around the globe
Stop this nonsense and begin the slow process of rebuilding trade relationships.
Build domestic demand for U.S. ag. products and strong international market promotion programs. Expanding renewable fuels is the easiest way to grow domestic demand.
Idle farmland?

18. Which sector of the U.S. ag economy should be most concerned about the trade war?

Which sector of the U.S. ag economy should be most concerned about the trade war?
The protein sector, and those areas for which we have the most competition around the world.
Any sector in which China is the dominate destination for world trade in that sector and for which growth in US domestic demand is limited.
The crop sector should be most concerned and more specifically soybean farmers.
not sure one should be more concerned than another.

As it is going currently, soybeans

All sectors will be significantly impacted

Almost all sectors will be impacted but those sectors so highly dependent on exports like cotton, wheat, soybeans, hides.

soybean producer

1) soybeans, 2) beef and 3) pork.

Grains and livestock

Effects are likely to be widespread, with the magnitudes of effects determined by things that remain uncertain, such as whether and when some tariffs might be rolled back or increased, and what types of new agreements might result.

Crop production.

Crops Sector

Crops

The U.S. consumer.

equipment manufacturing

Crops

Soybeans and wheat

Row crops, soybeans in particular

19. Can the U.S. reduce its reliance upon China?



19a. Why - Why?

Why?
It has little choice. We will continue to lose China as a customer of Ag products from a simple economic perspective as long as the dollar remains strong and Argentina and Brazil continue to have weak currencies - even without geopolitical tensions.
Other countries make up a significant share of world trade for most US agricultural commodities. The cost of transportation will increase but stocks are not high enough at present to preclude the US from being a needed source for most US agricultural commodities.
If the economic incentive exists, select industries could redevelop domestic production, and other trade partners could substitute certain products where they are similarly competitive to China. In either case the U.S. could become more insulated from adverse economic retaliation from China.
included in previous answer
There’s always the opportunity to reduce reliance on another nation, but it will take time and could be painful.
We can probably reduce our reliance but we will be worse off.
By virftue of tariffs so high, the US farmer has no choice
It will take time! However, Southeast Asia and India can replace the manufacturing capacity in China.
We could reduce that reliance, but that is not the same thing as saying we should or that it would benefit the farm sector or the country as a whole.
I can drink gasoline, too. That doesn't mean I should.
The reduction might be small, but our reliance on China can be reduced. Long-run, U.S. consumers will still be looking to purchase t-shirts and beach balls from China.
Ignoring comparative advantage is plain inefficient - and US should be looking to expand markets elsewhere in South-East Asia, i.e., look to join ASEAN

19b. Why Not?

Why Not?

Just my take but China is such a significant buyer that the loss of China as a key importer just can not be replaced by other markets in the near term.

We need them to take product. Period. We could shift product elsewhere, but China buying will always be good for the Agricultural Economy.

Any reduction in reliance will be small. That train has left the station.

20. How long will it take to reshore American manufacturing?



21. If the goal is to increase U.S. manufacturing, what would it take to spur that growth?

If the goal is to increase U.S. manufacturing, what would it take to spur that growth?

Ironically, protective tariffs of our own since our labor costs are so much higher.

Long-term economic incentive.
If production cannot be profitable by market revenue or policy support, it will not exist.

Certainty that tariffs or other cost-adjusting-barriers are permanent.

Not my area of expertise, but likely a combination of government policies, eager investors, and a willing/capable labor force.

I suppose enough economic pain might eventually do it to some extent but it requires turning back the economy by about 150 years.

Easing regulation, perhaps lower taxes or other incentives. And it will require the U.S. to adopt reasonable immigration policy to support what would likely be increased labor needs.

Policies that promote exports of US products that the US can competitively produce

Long term import tariffs, very large investment in automation and workforce development, and reinvestment in production capacity. My view is that workforce will be a larger constraint than investment capital.

Lower interest rates

A mix of policies, from tariffs to tax incentives to regulatory changes can result in more U.S. manufacturing. However, in no case should one expect a return to the day when a high portion of the U.S. labor force works in factories. The trend of more output per manufacturing worker will continue, and one might easily envision a significant growth in production with little or no growth in employment--as has occurred in the farm sector over the last century.

Migrant Labor.

Labor.

Here's the thing: U.S. manufacturing is producing at near-historic levels. We just don't need as many people as we used to. It's just like how one farmer now feeds so many more people than they used to.

There might be some rebuilding of the manufacturing base but the length of time it will take is too long and U.S. consumers will have baked in higher prices of buying goods from other countries.

Financial incentive. Tax cuts. Supports for market access.

Import restrictions are not the answer. Using robotics and other new technologies will be helpful.

Investment in technology/innovation, targeted at specific sectors

22. Are the President Trump's planned tariffs truly reciprocal?

22a. Why?

Why?

Yes, depending on how you account for currency manipulation and non-tariff restrictions.

The are imposed on other countries. Many of which may have direct tariffs or other trade policy measures on the U.S. It may be argued that the calculation to estimate reciprocal are not appropriate, and thus they are not truly reciprocal. Are they proposing reciprocal tariffs? Yes.
Are they appropriately estimated? Possibly, no.

22b. Why Not?

Why Not?

I marked no but could make the argument either way. They aren’t reciprocal by definition but are in line with the broader goal of reciprocity that is creating balance in trade between two nations.

They are based on trade imbalances which are a faulty, nonsense premise.

Reciprocal would be if their tariff is 10%, we would set our tariff at that same level — and this is not the case as the Trump tariffs seem to have been divined from a formula which only the Administration seems to support.

They are based upon rough estimates of trade deficits, to true trade barriers.

The formula used pays no attention to the size or nature of each country's tariffs and other trade restrictions.

They are based on the magnitude of our goods trade deficit with those countries, not the barriers that those countries impose on US exports.

They are retaliatory in nature. Reciprocal is just a nicer word.

I would look at how the bond market responded to the rollout of the tariffs. They acted like the U.S. wasn't pursuing a reciprocal strategy.

They are based on a trade deficit calculation which could be non tariff barriers but also could just be good relationships with other suppliers.

Trade balances are part of the U.S. countermeasures, not just the tariff rates.

The method used to set the tariffs does not make any sense and was not based on actual tariffs. It seems to have been based on the size of the trade deficits.

The formula used had no economic basis whatsoever - plus the focus on bilateral deficits is just plain silly

23. Do you think China and the U.S will reach an agreement to revisit the Phase One trade deal?



24. In the next 10 years, which country ultimately benefits the most from the current trade turbulence? - Selected Choice



24a. Other (please specify) - Text

Other (please specify) - Text
India

25. What’s the one factor impacting the ag economy that’s not being talked about or covered by the media enough right now?

What’s the one factor impacting the ag economy that’s not being talked about or covered by the media enough right now?

Currency exchange rates and how they're playing into the changing trade relationships.
Crops cost of production: input costs.
all major factors I know of have been covered to some degree. Lots are just ongoing.
Agriculture needs our policy-makers to step up and get a Farm Bill implemented that is more reflective of today’s situation, not that which existed when the 2018 Bill was implemented. While Congress has much on its plate, it’s important and I also feel the general public sees bailout after bailout and that isn’t good for public support in the longer-run.
Availability of labor
The intermediate and long term impact of a shrinking workforce (due to demographic changes).
Restructuring of USDA. Ag markets depend on the flow of data and information from USDA.
Future biofuel policy decisions could prove very important.
Low cash flow carry over into a year when prices are mostly abysmal on the crop side.
The existential threat to the future of U.S. land grant colleges is not being discussed enough.
Loss of support for new biofuels markets
Financial stress is going to be more prevalent for farms with high leverage and for less experienced farms (e.g., young farmers that do not farm with an older generation).
The risk to USMCA if the trade war really hots up with Canada and Mexico

26. When do you think Congress will pass a new farm bill?



27. Does the ECAP program make it more difficult for Congress to pass a Farm Bill in 2025?



Q409 - What is the biggest hurdle in passing a Farm Bill in 2025?

What is the biggest hurdle in passing a Farm Bill in 2025?

MONEY

The budget. If the new farm bill has to have no new spending similar to the 2018 farm bill, then which title wins and which title loses is the biggest fight.

Time given other items on the Congressional agenda and the negotiations over the budget and spending levels.

If pieces of the farm bill are passed through reconciliation.

The Farm Bill just isn’t as important to the Administration as is getting their policy agenda through Congress.

Baseline budget

The budget. If farm legislation is approved in 2025, it will likely be part of the budget reconciliation bill and passed without Democratic support, meaning increased support for farmers is provided by deeper cuts in SNAP. Only if that effort collapses is there any real possibility of a bipartisan farm bill.

They have to be working on a bill first. Currently, I do not think a bill is even in the works.

ARC and PLC aren't effective or popular programs.

Congress doesn't seem to want to pass any bills at all, let alone a bipartisan one.

Budget

SNAP (and the likelihood of safety net adjustments via budget reconciliation.

In general, Congress has difficulty passing any legislation. This is very detrimental to the long-run health of U.S. agriculture and the U.S. economy. We simply have to address entitlements and deficit spending in the next few years.

Pushing back on SNAP